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Jerome H. Mooney #2303
MOONEY & SMITH
356 South 300 East
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-5635
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH
oooOooo
VICKIE BURROW,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,

)

vs.

SUPREME COURT NO, 20294

)

MARK VRONTIKIS,

)

Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

)
oooOooo

This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the District
Court of the Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County, State
of Utahr the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This case involves the question of whether the right to back
support within the period of limitation provided by Utah Code
Annotated,

Section 78-45a-3

is subject to the doctrine of

equitable estoppel*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The lower court determined that the defendant was the father
of the plaintiff's child, born the 17th day of August, 1976,

The

Court further determined that the plaintiff should receive child
support in the amount of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month,
running from June of 1983 when Plaintiff filed her Complaint in
this matter. (See Judgment)
was not appealed.

This portion of the Courtfs Order

The Court further, however, provided judgment

against the defendant in the amount of Seven Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars ($7,200.00) for back support for the period June, 1979,
through June, 1983.

The trial court looked at the elements of

the doctrines of latches and estoppel but determined as a matter
of law that they could not be applied to obligations arising
under Title 78, Chapter 45a. (Judgment and Findings of Fact).

It

is from this judgment for back support that defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant

respectfully

submits that the doctrine of

equitable estoppel is and should be fully applicable to claims
for back support under Title 78, Chapter

45a of Utah Code

Annotated, and that the judgment rendered by the District Court
should be reversed, and the matter remanded to allow the District
Court to consider application of the doctrine of estoppel against
such claim.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Judgment was entered by the District Court on the 18th day
of September, 1984.

Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal

which was perfected, and pursuant to stipulation, provided a
supersedeas bond against the appealed from judgment in the amount
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff and defendant dated during the latter part of

1975 and the early months of 1976.

The relationship, although

meeting the physical requirements for conception, never grew to
one of emotional commitment*

The plaintiff was then eighteen or
5

nineteen and the Defendant a twenty year old. (TRf pg. 34-35)
2. In approximately March of 1976, the plaintiff discovered
that she was pregnant and met the defendant to advise him of
these facts.
3.

(TRf pg. 36)

Following that meeting, there was no direct contact

between the plaintiff and defendant for a period of seven years.
(TR, pg. 38-39)
4.

Plaintiff determined that she wanted to raise the child

"separately and independently of Mark Vrontikisn. (TR, pg. 21,
Ln. 24, pg. 22, Ln. 13)
5.

This decision was made even prior to the plaintifffs

conversation with the defendant wherein he was advised of her
pregnancy.
6.

(TR, pg. 22-23)

The defendant

was subsequently

advised

of the

plaintiff's desire not to see him, to have no contact with him,
and to have him play no role in the life of the child.

(TR, pg.

38-39)
7.

Plaintiff subsequently married Allan Burrow and has had

two children from that relationship. (TR, pg. 4) No claim for
support or contact with the defendant was made by the plaintiff
until January of 1983.

That contact resulted in the instant

matter being filed in June of 1983.
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is properly applicable to
claims arising under a statute. The doctrine has been applied to
cases involving past support obligations for a child born in
wedlock. There is no reason to distinguish between the rights of

the mother of a child born out of wedlock to recover past
support, in spite of her wrongdoing, from the rights of the
mother of a child born in wedlock*

The trial court should have

applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the past support
obligation and reached a resolution based on the facts.
ARGUMENT
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL MAY BAR
A RECOVERY FOR PART OR ALL OF A JUDGMENT
FOR BACK SUPPORT IN ACTIONS INSTITUTED
UNDER UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, TITLE 78,
CHAPTER 45A.
All parents have a duty to support their children*
Code Annotated, Section 78-45-3.

Utah

This duty applies whether the

child is a product of a solemnized relationship or born out of
wedlock. Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45a-l. But with this
obligation comes parental rights and the opportunity to
participate in the enjoyment of the child.

See Slade £* Dennis*

594 p.2d 898 (1979), Ttmm^a £*. CMlflren's Mil Society sdL Pgden,
12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961).
In 1981, this Court determined that there was no statute of
limitations on determinations of paternity.
636 P.2d 1082 (1981).

Szarak Y±. Sandoval,

The statutory scheme of the uniform act on

paternity, however, provides a statute of limitations against
recovery for back support. On what would appear to be the theory
that each separate expenditure toward support gives rise to a new
claim or cause of action for participation by the putative
father, no claim is allowed for support claims outside a four
year period preceding the commencement of an action for determination of paternity.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45a-3.
7

It is concern for the needs and interests of the child which
drive the non-application of statutes of limitations to the
determinations of paternity.
"We are unable to find any time limitation as
to when a suit may be instituted to determine
paternity* The child has an interest in the
matter, and courts should be reluctant to invent limitations not set out in the statute,
especially where minor children may be adversely affected thereby.
..• In cases of establishing paternity, there
are other public policy considerations such
as the need of the minor child for support
and the requirement that the man who actually
sired the child be required to furnish itfs
support. Nielsen &n& th& State Q± Utah &£
£ M through £te Utah State Pepartment Ql

Social Services

3L*. Hansen,

564 p.2d 113,

(1977)
To this end/ it has been determined that a parent cannot
release the right to future support.
153, 289 P.2d 1044, GulleY ^

Price JLL Price, 4 Utah 2d

Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (1977).

It

has thus been recognized that a right to support is owed by every
parent to their child.
support.

This obligation, however, is for future

Thus, every action which is brought for a determination

of support obligations, as well as a claim for reimbursement for
past support, is in fact two separate claims representing the
interests of at least two separate parties.

The Missouri Court

of Appeals described this as two remedies, one looking to future
support of the child, the other a common law independent action
seeking to recover reimbursement for expenses already incurred.
"The two remedies are conterminous rather than concurrent, and
the one begins where the other ends." ilmiiJl Zt. SffiUJl, 300 S.W.
2d 275, 278 (Mo. App. 1957).

Missouri has also applied this

8

principal to claims for recovery of past expenditures for the
support of illegitimate children.
"We believe the same principal applies
where a mother seeks future support for her
illegitimate child as well as recovery for
past expenditures. The latter action has
nothing to do with child support; the
mother alone is entitled to reimbursement
upon the basis of her quasi contractual relationship with the child1s father." (Citation omitted). In the child's support
count in this case, the son is the true
party in interest and is represented by his
mother only because of the disability to
pursue by reason of minority. (Citations
omitted). In her action for reimbursement,
the mother is the only interested Plaintiff.
"If [the judgment is] collected, that money
goes to her, not to the child, who has already had the past support." (Citations
omitted). V*. JLL £*.r 579 S.W. 2d 149, 151152 (Mo. App. 1979).
This Court has recognized this principal with respect to
past support.
"However, this [the rights of the child to
future support] does not mean that a
mother may not, by her actions or representations, or both, preclude herself from
recovering past due installments of support money to reimburse her for the money
which she has spent for the support of the

child."

karson su parson* 5 ut.2d 224.

300 P.2d 596, 598 (1956); see also Wases£M Z,. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (1976) .
In the instant case, the defendant asserted that plaintifffs
claim for past support should be barred by the doctrine of
latches and/or equitable estoppel.

The trial court examined the

evidence against defendant's claim, but determined that he was
unable to apply this doctrine or provide any relief.

"I do not

condone the plaintiff's conduct in waiting some six years to make
claim for support in the form of a lump sum obligation.

9

It may

well be that had notice been given to the defendant much earlier,
out of claim for back support, the defendant could have shared
certain of the expenses incident to the raising of the child and
thereby reduced the plaintifffs financial hardship*

Conversely,

had that been done, he would not now be faced with the difficult
problem of a large lump sum obligation with his current family
obligations and his new child.

However, this Court is bound by

the statutory scheme of the Utah Legislature and acted in the
Uniform Paternity Act, Title 78-45a and following, as well as the
language of our Supreme Court in interpreting that act under
Getto (sic) vs. Butler Case, 584 P.2d 868, wherein it was stated
that the equitable doctrines of latches and estoppel have no
relevance in an action of this type since it is based upon a
statutory schemen

(TR, pg. 5, In. 8-25)

Zito }u Butler. 584 P.2d 868 (1978) is a per curium decision
of this Court affirming an award of both future support and past
support for an illegitimate child.

The primary attack of the

appellant who appeared pro se, seems to have rested on a claim of
Statute of Limitations.

This Court, however, includes the

following two sentences in that decision:
"Defendant also seeks to invoke the equitable
doctrines of estoppel and latches. This being
a statutory action, neither has any application." Id. at 869.
The only support for these sentences is a reference to 27 AmJur
2d, Equity Sec. 154.

That section is fully set forth in the

attachment hereto, but in pertinent part provides as follows:
"Latches is an equitable defense, and generally
it arises only where there has been an unreasonable delay in asserting an equitable remedy.
Ordinarily the defense may not be invoked in a
10

court of law, the action of the latter court
being governed by the statute of limitations.
It is said that only where the elements of an
estoppel are present, may latches constitute
a bar in an action at law* (Emphasis added).
Id.
The unfortunate two sentences cited above from Zito v.
Butler and relied upon by the trial court find no support in law
and are inconsistent with prior rulings of this Court where the
issues were properly represented on both sides.
terms

"latches"

interchangeably

and

"estoppel"

throughout

are

the legal

separate and distinct principals.

Even though the

utilized

profession,

almost
they

are

Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262

(1980) .

Traditionally,
"(1)

l a t c h e s e x i s t s where two elements are proved:

The lack of d i l i g e n c e on the p a r t of p l a i n t i f f ;

(2)

An i n j u r y

diligence."

to

£.SE£HA]LQ1 AS.

defendant

owing

to

such

SllS.a£ll£il£.£ £ JlfiEPins

3LL

lack

of

££!Lk££

Associates, 535 p.2d 1256, 1260 (1975); Leaver iu Grose, supra at
1264.
While the equitable function of latches may well serve the
same fundamental principals as a statute of limitations, and may
have questionable application where a statute of limitations has
been provided or the claim based upon doctrines of law as opposed
to equity, it is the primary force and function of equitable
estoppel to attack the ability of a party to rely upon statutory
protections.

In J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 534

P.2d 903 (1975), Koch sued to recover labor and materials
furnished

as a subcontractor

on a construction

job to the

defendants, wherein the general contractor had become insolvent.

11

Plaintiff relied upon the statutory bonding requirements to
impute liability for its claim on the defendants.

Defendants

claimed that plaintiffs were estopped through their actions from
relying upon the statute.

In ruling in favor of the defendants,

and against the application of the statute, this court stated as
follows:
"The position of the plaintiff in support of
the ruling of the trial court seems to be that
failure of the owner to furnish the bond required by Section 14-2-1 results absolute liability; and that the plaintiff could neither
waive its right nor be estopped from enforcing
it* This, of course is not right* Notwithstanding the provisions of that statute, there
is no question but that a person may waive or
forego the right it gives him, the same as he
could any other property right." Id. at 904.
Thus equitable doctrine can be applied and statutory schemes are
not absolute in the face of equity.

"It is a doctrine of equity

to prevent one party from diluting or inducing another into a
position where he will unjustly suffer loss."

Id. at 905.

It is further well recognized that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel may be applied specifically against the application of
the statute of limitations.

Rice ^

Granite School District, 456

P.2d 159 (1969) .
Additionally, this doctrine is no stranger to claims based
upon the claims for past support.

Larspn 3LL Larson* supra*;

Kasescha z± wasescha* supra; In JLS Marriage al Sz&mokl,

47 Cal.

App. 3d 812 (Cal., 1975).
In the case of Larson su Larson* supra* provides the most
indepth analysis of this application to obligations for past due
support.

In Larson, the defendant provided no support to the

minor children of the parties from 1947 to 1955. The defendant

12

maintained that his failure to provide support during this period
was predicated upon representations from the mother of the
children that "• . . all she wanted from the appellant is that he
should refrain from trying to see her or the child."

Id. at 596.

In reliance upon representations of the respondent, the appellant
in the LSLJLS.Q.11 case had remarried
obligations.

and had taken on other

As in the instant case, no relationship

was

maintained with the children and the father changed his situation
from that existing at the time the obligation was incurred.

As

in the instant case, the trial court determined a defense of
latches or estoppel was not available to the Larson appellant.
This court determined that estoppel was applicable in such a
circumstance.

The Larson court noted:

"Where the fatherfs failure to make such payments was induced by her representations or
actions, and where, as a result of such representations or actions the father has been
lulled into failing to make such payments and
into changing his position which he would not
have done but for such representations, and
that as a result of such failure to pay and
change in his conditions, it will cause him
great hardship and injustice if she is allowed
to enforce the payment of such back installments, she may be thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of such back installments." Id
at 598.
There is no logical basis upon which to predicate a distinction
between the application of estoppel to a back support obligation
founded

upon

a decree

of divorce

determination of paternity.

from

founded

upon the

The illegitimate child bears no

greater interest at law than that of a lawful marriage and in
fact, as indicated above, has no relationship to the claim made
by the mother for repayment.

The actions of a mother claiming

13

back support founded upon a decree of divorce may be analyzed by
the trial court for a determination of estoppel. Likewise, the
trial court in the instant case should have been allowed to apply
the doctrine in this matter.

The unfortunate language of Zito s^

Butler", supra should be corrected to correct the confusion
created thereby and bring its principals into consistency with
the body of law dealing with the subject of estoppel as
established and existing within the State of Utah and throughout
the United States.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
remanded as to the judgment in the amount of Seven Thousand Two
Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00) predicated upon back support and
remanded to allow application of the doctrine of estoppel.
DATED this 2^2^

day of March, 1985^^?

JEROME H. MOONEY
Attorney for the Appellant

14

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Brief, postage fully prepaid, to:

Dated this 2~*-

THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR.
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
aay 0 f March, 1 985.
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THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128)
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5650
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
• VICKIE BURROW,
\

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. C83-3916
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

MARK VRONTIKIS,
Defendant.
oooOooo

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the aboveentitled Court, on Monday, the 13th day of August, 1984, at the
hour of 2:00 p.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through her
attorney Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant appearing in
person and through his attorney Jerome H. Mooney of the firm of
Mooney and Smith, and the Court having heard the stipulation of
the parties by and through their respective counsel as to certain
issues, having heard the sworn testimony of the plaintiff and
defendant, having heard the arguments of counsel, having considere
the contents of the

Court's file, and good cause appearing

therefore, and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law;
-1-

NOW,

THEREFORE;
ORDERED

IT IS H E R E B Y
1*
declared

That

to be

the p l a i n t i f f ,

Vickie

Laverne

shall

Chad

Laverne

of

reasonable

That

rights

6hall

without

be

4.

iparties
until
as

order

is

hereby
son

certificate

of

child's

of

Chad

name

is

of this

and

shall

not

the

Court.

defendant
for

be

be

5.

That
child
of

entitled
tax

the p l a i n t i f f
support

for
May 3 1 ,

from

$3,000.00

a judgment

amount
the

child

of

of

to

to

the m i n o r
effective

of child

the

the

Court's

any

perse-*

pay

to

child
June

of m a j o r i t y .

claim

June

the

of

1,

That

the
the

1983,

so

long

support,

the

minor

child

as

a

1,

1983

a credit
cost

of

judgment

against

the

through August

31,

in the

the HLA

sum

in

the

Tissue

sum

Typing

$2,750.00.

plaintiff

in

is granted

less

of

support

1983,

opened

payment

to

to

purposes.

one-half

That

age

and

subject

judgment,

is ordered

the benefit

in his

care, custody

defendant.

entry

the

the

Vrontikis,

the

is current

income

for

through

in the

the

of

defendant

Laverne

reaches

for

6.

Chad

child

sum

for

is awarded

per m o n t h ,

11984, in the

Test,

and

Harney,

the minor

$200.00

shall

$250.00

that

be

Laverne

the birth

sum of

the d e f e n d a n t

for

of

support

the minor

defendant

child

upon

That

in the

deduction

to

plaintiff

sealed

child

defendant

amended

Vrontikis

of Chad

That

of v i s i t a t i o n

That

further

plaintiff

the

the m i n o r

3.
file

father

Burrow.
be

Mark

Vrontikis.

2.
(control

follows:

the d e f e n d a n t

the n a t u r a l

Harney

as

for

the

is granted

judgment

the period

from

sum

2

of

$7,200.00,

against

June

1,

the
1979

representing

support at a rate of $150.00 per month.
7.
child
any

on

That the defendant is ordered to maintain the minor

the defendant's medical insurance and pay one-half

medical

or dental expense incurred on behalf of

the

of

minor

child which is not paid by said insurance.
8.

That

the

defendant

is

ordered

to

obtain

and

maintain $20,000.00 of life insurance on his lifef with the minor
child

of

the parties named as beneficiary

thereof,

until

the

minor child reaches age 18.
9.
defendant

That the plaintiff is granted judgment against the

for her costs of Court incurred herein in the

$34.75.
DATED this

day of

, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge
Approved as to form:

3

sum

of

THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. (0128)
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 36 3-5650
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
VICKIE BURROW,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C83-3916
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

MARK VRONTIKIS,
Defendant.

-oooOoooThe above-entitled action came on regularly for trial
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the aboveentitled Court, on Monday, the 13th day of August, 1984, at the
hour of 2:00 p.m., plaintiff appearing in person and through her
attorney Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and the defendant appearing in
person and through his attorney Jerome H. Mooney of the firm of
Mooney and Smith, and the Court having heard the stipulation of
the parties by and through their respective counsel as to certain
issues, having heard the sworn testimony of the plaintiff and
defendant, having heard the arguments of counsel, having considere
the contents of the Court's file, and good cause appearing
therfor, now makes and enters the following:

-1-

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the defendant, Mark Vrontikis, is the natural

father of plaintiff's son, Chad Laverne Harney.

,

That the birth

certificate of Chad Laverne Harney should be amended so that the
minor child's name is Chad Laverne Vrontikis.
2.

That the plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody

i and control of the minor child Chad Laverne Vrontikis, subject to j
i

!

!

j reasonable rights of visitation in the defendant.

j

i

i

i

i

i

j

3.

That upon the entry of judgment in this matter, the

j Court's file should be sealed and should not be opened to any

I
j

j person without further order of the Court.
4.

That the income of the plaintiff and her husband and

| the income of the defendant and his wife appear to be roughly
1

! equivalent, and child support for the minor child should be
ordered commensurate with the defendant's ability to pay and the j
child's needs.

That the Court finds that the current expenses for

the minor child are the sum of $436.00, and that each parent
i should be responsible for approximately one-half (1/2) of the

j

i

'

J child's expenses and the defendant should therefore be ordered to j
j pay child support to the plaintiff in the sum of $200.00 per month:,
I effective June 1, 1983, until the child reaches the age of majority.
j

!
i

J That so long as the defendant is current in his payments of child j
j support, the defendant shall be entitled to claim the minor child I
Chad Laverne Vrontikis as a deduction for income tax purposes.

5,

That the provisions of the Utah Uniform Act on

Paternity, Sections 78-45(a)-1, et seq., Utah Code Annoated
(1953 as amended) and the case of Zito v. Butler, 584 P2d 868
(Utah 1978) entitled the plaintiff to recover a lump sum for
support furnished to the minor child in the four (4) year period
preceding plaintiff's filing of this action.

That the plaintiff's

i recent increase in monthly living expenses indicates that the
i

i support furnished to the minor child in the past was less than at
I
I present and the sum of $150.00 per month is a reasonable amount

i

for the minor child's support for the pericd from June 1979 through
j May 31, 1983, for a total sum of $7,200.00.

That the defendant

I should be entitled to a credit against this amount for one-half

I
1

I

(1/2) of the cost of the HL-A tissue typing tests.
6.

That the defendant should be ordered to maintain the

l minor child Chad Laverne Vrontikis on the defendant's medical
I
j
1
i insurance and pay one-half (1/2) of any medical or dental expense
I incurred on behalf of the minor child which is not paid by said
ll
i1 insurance.
i

i

!
7. That the defendant should obtain and maintain
j
I$20,000.00 of life insurance on his life, with the minor child of

P
I the parties named as beneficiary thereof, until the minor child

>
t

j!

I reaches age 18.
;

i

j

8.

That the defendant should be ordered ^o reimburse the j

[plaintiff for her costs of Court incurred herein.

I
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From

the

foregoing Findings of Fact,

the

Court

now

makes and enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS 0£ LAW
1.
But ler»
Estoppel

supra,
with

This
and

Court
may

respect

is

bound by the ruling

in

not apply the Doctrine of

to past support obligations

Zito

y.

Latches

or

in

bastardy

actions.
2,

That

a

Judgment

should be entered

with the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this

day of August, 1984.

BY THE COURT:

District
App*vpv_£d as to form:

Judge

in

accordance

CHAPTER 45a
I'NIFORM ACT ON PATEBNITY
Section 78-45a-l.
78-45a-2.
78-45a-3.
78-45a-4.
78-45a-5.
78-45a-6.
78-45a-7.
78-45a-8.
78-45a-9.
78-45a-10.
78-45a-ll.
78-45a-12.
78-45a-13.
78-45a-14.
78-45a-15.
78-45a-16.
78-45a-17.

Obligations of the father.
Enforcement.
Limitation on recovery from the father.
Limitations on recovery from father's estate.
Remedies.
Time of trial.
Authority for blood tests.
Selection of experts.
Compensation of expert witnesses.
Effect of test results.
Judgment.
Security.
Settlement agreements.
Venue.
Uniformity of interpretation.
Short title.
Operation of act.

78-45a-l. Obligations of the father.—The father of a child which is or
may be born out of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a
child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses of the child. A child born out
of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other
than her husband.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to paternity; providing
for the enforcement of duties thereof and
making uniform the law with respect to
paternity.—L. 1965, ch. 158.
Comparable Provisions.
States that have adopted the Uniform
Act on Paternity include: Kentucky,
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, and New
Hampshire.

Cross-Eeferences.
Bastardy Act, 77-60-1 et seq.
Injunction not to issue against order of
department or action of county attorney
or attorney general, 78-45b-19.
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act,
78-45-1 et seq.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, 77-61a-l et seq.
Bastardy Act.
This act does not repeal the Bastardy
Act, chapter CO of Title 77, or any part
thereof. State v. Judd, 27 U. (2d) 79, 493
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Uniform Act on Paternity since her cause
of action cannot be filed under both
statutes. Brown v. Marrelli, 527 P. 2d 230.

P. 2d 604; State v. Abram, 27 U. (2d)
266, 495 P. 2d 313.
Custody Rights.
Father who publicly acknowledged his
paternity had right to custody of his illegitimate child, second only to mother's
right, so that it was improper for juvenile
court to dismiss petition for custody and
thereby terminate father's parental right
without hearing to determine whether he
was fit and proper person. State in Interest of Baby Girl M, 25 U. (2d) 101, 476
P. 2d 1013, 45 A. L. R. 3d 206.

Collateral References.
Bastards€=>16.
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 18.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 895, Bastards § 68.

Plaintiff's election of remedies.
Bastardy cases are tried as civil matters
rather than criminal even though the cases
are brought in the name of the state, and
the plaintiff mother must elect whether to
proceed under the Bastardy Act or the

Foreign filiation or support o r ier in baatarcy proceedings, requiring periodic payments, as extraterritorially enforceable, 16
A. L. R. 2d 1098.
Provision in divorce decree against
mother's husband, not the father of her
illegitimate child, for its support, 90 A. L.
R. 2d 583.
Validity and construction of putative
father's promise to Bupport or provide for
illegitimate child, 20 A. L. R. 3d 500.

78-45a-2. Enforcement.—Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, or the public authority chargeable by law with
the support of the child. If paternity has been determined or has been
acknowledged according to the laws of this state, the liabilities of the
father may be enforced in the same or other proceedings (1) by the mother,
child, or the public authority which have furnished or may furnish the
reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses, and (2) by other persons including private
agencies to the extent that they have furnished the reasonable expenses of
pregnancy, confinement, education, I ^cessary support, or funeral expenses.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2.
Cross-Reference.
Enforcement of provisions by department of social services, 55-15a-24.
CoUateral References.
BastardsC=>19 et seq.
10 C.J S Bastards § 32 et seq.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 900 et seq., Bastards § 74
et seq.
Death of putative father as precluding
nction for determination of paternity or
for child support, 58 A. L. R. 3d 188.*
Effect of death of child prior to institution of bastardy proceedings bv mother,
7 A. L. R. 2d 1397.
Maintainability of bastardy proceedings
against infant defendant without appointment of guardian ad litem, 69 A. L. R. 2d
1379.

Maintainability of bastardy proceedings
by infant prosecutrix in her own name and
right, 50 A. L. R. 2d 1029.
Marriage of woman to one other than
defendant as affecting her right to institute or maintain bastardv proceeding, 9S
A. L. R. 2d 256.
Nonresident mother's right to maintain
bastardy proceedings, 57 A. L. R. 2d 6S9.
Right of mentally incompetent mother
to institute bastardv proceeding, 71 A. L.
R. 2d 1261.
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or
bastardy proceedings, 59 A. L. R. 3d 685.
Tempoiary allowance for support or
costs pending action or proceeding for
declaration of paternitv of an illegitimate
child, 136 A. L. R. 1264.
What amounts to recognition within
statutes affecting the status or rights of
illegitimates, 33 A. L. R. 2d 705.

78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father.—The father's liabilities for past education and necessary support are limited to a period of
four years next preceding the commencement of an action.
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History: L. 19S5, ch. 168, § 3.

10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 936, Bastards § 127.

Collateral References.
BastardsC=>34.

78-45&-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate.—The obligal
of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are limited
amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be payable
dependency under other laws.
History: L. 1^65, ch. 158, § 4.
_
,
CoUateral References.
BastardsC=>34.

10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 936, Bastards § 127.

78-45a-5. Remedies.—(1) The district court has jurisdiction of
action under this act and all remedies for the enforcement of judgmen
for expenses of pregnancy and confinement for a wife or for educatio
necessary support, or funeral expenses for legitimate children apply. Tl
court has continuing jurisdiction to modif}* or revoke a judgment f<
future education and necessary support. All remedies under the Unifori
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available for enforcement c
duties of support under this act.
(2) The otligee may enforce his right of support against the obligo
and the state department of social services may proceed on behalf of th
obligee ui m its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of chapter 45b ol
this title to enforce that right of support against the obligor. In sucl
actions by the department, all the provisions of chapter 45b of this title
shall be equally applicable to this chapter. Whenever a court action is
commenced by the state department of social services, it shall be the duty
of the attorney general or the county attorney, of the county of residence
of the obligee, to represent that department.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, §5; 1975, ch.
96, § 24.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment designated the
former section as subsec. (1); added subFCC (2); and made minor changes in
pi 'aseo)og> m subsec. (]).

Cross-Reference.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Sll , >0,, A r t
Il
' " 6 1 a 1 e t sc<*'
Collateral References.
Ba^.ud<:C=>80 et sen.
10 CJ.S Bastards §§116, 117.
1 0 Am Jur. 2d 935 et seq, Bastards
§ 126 ct s(q.

78-45a-6. Time of trial.—If the issue of paternity is raised in action
commenced during the pregnancy of the mother, the trial shall not, without
the consent of the alleged father, he held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such delay testimony may be perpetrated according to
the laws of this state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 15-, § 6,
^ „
, ^ ,
Collateral References.
BaBtards'J=>67.

10 C.J.R Bastards § 101.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 932,' Bastards 8 123.

78-45a-7. Authority for blood tests.—The court, upon its own initiative
or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person whose blood is in520
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volved may, or upon motion of any party to the action made at a time so
as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order the mother, child and
alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to
such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against such
party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice
so require.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7.
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 928, Bastards § 118.
Cross-Reference.
Blood tests to determine parentage, 78Weight and sufficiency of blood grouping
25-18 to 78-25-23.
test to Bhow paternity or legitimacy, 46 A.
L. R. 2d 1027.
Collateral References.
Bastards065.
78-45a-8. Selection of experts.—The tests shall he made by experts
qualified as examiners of blood types who shall be appointed by the court.
The experts shall be called by the court as witnesses to testify to their
findings and shall be subject to cross-examination by the parties. Any p a r t y
or perse , at whose suggestion the tests have been ordered may demand t h a t
other experts, qualified as examiners of blood types, perform independent
tests under order of court, the results of which may be offered in evidence.
The number and qualifications of such experts shall be determined by the
court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8.
Cross-Reference.
Blood test examiner as witness, 78-25-20.
78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses.—The compensation of each
expert witness appointed by the court shall be fixed at a reasonable amount.
It shall be paid as the court shall order. The court may order that it be
paid by the parties in such proportions and at such times as it shall prescribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but not appointed
by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not be taxed
as costs in the action.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 9.
CoUateral References.
BastardsC=>94.
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 138.
78-45a-10. Effect of test results.—If the court finds that the conclusions
of all experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, arc t h a t
the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity
shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or
conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence. If the
experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged
father's paternity, admission of this evidence is within the discretion of the
court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10.
Cross-Reference.
Admissibility of blood test results, 782r» 21.
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Collateral References.
Bastard*S=>65.
10 C J . 8 . Bastards § 93.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 922, Bastards § 107.

Eight to jury trial in bastardy proceed™Z*> ** A - ^ B - 2 d 1 1 2 8 -

78-45a-ll. Judgment.—Judgments under this act may be for periodic
payments which may vary in amount. The court may order payments to be
made to the mother or to some person, corporation, or agency designated to
administer them under the supervision of the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 11.

Judgment in bastardy proceeding at
conclusive of issues ir. subsequent baatardy proceeding, 37 A. L. E. 2d 836.
Bight of mother of illegitimate child to
appeal from order or judgment entered in
bastardy proceedings, 18 A. L. K. 2d 948.

Collateral References.
Ba8tards@=>78.
10 C.J.8. Bastards § 111.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 936, Bastards § 127.

78-45a-12. Security.—The court may require the alleged father to give
bond or other security for the payment of the judgment.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 12.

10 C.J.8. Bastards § 118 et ieq.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 936, Bastards § 128.

CoUateTal Eeferences.
Bastards^=84 et se^.

78-45a-13. Settlement agreements.—An agreement of settlement with
the alleged father is binding only when approved by the court.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 13.
CoUateral References.
BastardsC=>26.
10 C.J.S. Bastards § 40 et seq.
30 Am. Jur. 2d 917 et seq., Bastards §98
et seq.

Avoidance of lump-sum settlement or
release of bastardy claim on grounds of
fraud> mistake, or duress, 84 A. L. B. 2d
593.
Lump-sura compromise and settlement,
or release, of bastardy cla m or of bastardy or paternity proceedings, 84 A. L.
R. 2d 524.

78-45a-14. Venue.—An action under this act may be brought in the
county where the alleged father is present or has property or in the county
where the mother resides.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14.

10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 57, 58.
10 Am. Jur. 2d 902, Bastards § 76.

Collateral References.
Bastards036.

78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation.—This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law of those states which enact it.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 15.

78-45a-16. Short title.—This act shall be known and may be cited as
the "Uniform Act on Paternity."
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 16.

78-45a-17. Operation of act.—This act applies to all cases of birth out of
wedlock as defined in this act where birth occurs after this act takes effect.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 17.
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